

C/PRD
AD/DCI/IC
D/DCI/IC

Handwritten:
5/16/74

Attached is a Talking Points memorandum to the DCI for his visit to the Strategic Warning Staff on 23 May.

Also attached for your review is a draft of a report to USIB on the strategic warning function. I plan to review it also with [redacted] It should not go out until after the DCI's visit to the SWS on the 23rd.

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
[redacted] DC/PRD

5/16/74

Director of Central Intelligence

You will note there is no reference to the Mayaguez incident in the attached memorandum. In my view, this was not a strategic warning situation under the criteria of DCID 1/5 and thus was not a responsibility of Faurer and

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I propose to address this point in my USIB briefing on 22 May.


/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

LTG Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC

21 MAY 1975

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Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050002-4



IC 75-1472

21 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your 23 May Visit
to the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS)

1. The SWS's second Monthly Report issued at the end of April showed a marked improvement over its March report. Our earlier concern that the staff was spreading its focus to cover essentially small-w areas of warning has largely abated. We are particularly impressed by (and take some credit for) the way in which the articles in the April issue make explicit the relevance of the subject matter to strategic warning. We suggest you

--comment favorably on the selectivity displayed in the April Monthly Report (and in the Alert Lists) and on the explicit way in which subject matter is related to strategic warning.

2. Because there will always be a gray area between strategic and small-w warning, and thus between the warning functions of the SWS and the NIOs, we suggest you might ask Faurer and Hanrahan

--how does the SWS view its relationship to the NIO structure on the warning process; is there anything I (the DCI) should do to ensure effective coordination between the two?

3. Some elements of the community are urging the SWS to prepare daily notes similar to the former National Indications Center (NIC) Notes. [] and [] are still considering this possibility but tend to oppose it on the grounds that it would be a relatively heavy burden on the staff and reduce the time available for its primary (analytical) function. We agree and suggest you

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
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--discourage the publication by the SWS of any kind of daily product. *

4. [] and [] are attempting to devise an effective means (graphically or textually) of conveying a "temperature reading" of strategic warning indicators, perhaps in the Monthly Report or through some other medium. The Soviet-Romania tension chart in the April Monthly Report is an experiment to this end. We believe this idea has merit and suggest you

--encourage the SWS to develop techniques for conveying periodic changes in the level of strategic threat to the US.



Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

** I hope to discuss this point with you further while we are riding over to the Pentagon.*

Distribution:

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DCI/IC/PRD [] (14 May 75)

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	Director of Central Intelligence				
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: <p>You will note there is no reference to the Mayaguez incident in the attached memorandum. In my view, this was <u>not</u> a strategic warning situation under the criteria of DCID 1/5 and thus was not a responsibility of [] and [].</p> <p>I propose to address this point in my USIB briefing on 22 May.</p>					
		URN TO SENDER			
		PHONE NO.		DATE	
LTC Samuel V. Wilson		D/DCI/IC		21 MAY 1976	
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DRAFT: [REDACTED]
14 May 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Strategic Warning

REFERENCE: USIB-D-5.1/36, 26 February 1975

1. This memorandum responds to the charge in paragraph 6 of DCID 1/5 that a report be submitted periodically to USIB on the functioning of the strategic warning process.

2. In accordance with DCID 1/5, [REDACTED] formally assumed the function of Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning on 3 March 1975. Also on that date, the Strategic Warning Staff under the direction of [REDACTED] was established and collocated with the National Military Intelligence Center in DIA. The Staff, including [REDACTED] currently consists of nine analysts--three each from DIA and CIA, two from NSA, and one from the Air Force.

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3. Since its inception, the Strategic Warning Staff has had no occasion to issue a strategic warning notice, as specified in paragraph 3.b. of DCID 1/5.

4. The Strategic Warning Staff has been producing two series of publications:

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--a weekly Alert List, sent primarily to collection elements of the Community and designed to insure collection focus on issues that have strategic warning implications; and

--a Monthly Report disseminated widely through the Community and designed to sensitize the Community to foreign developments that have strategic warning implications.

The Alert Lists are admirably precise in identifying gaps in information that, if provided, would contribute to the resolution of uncertainties on issues related to strategic warning. The Monthly Report is similarly precise in making explicit the relevance of its subject matter to strategic warning issues. Both publications reveal that the Strategic Warning Staff is maintaining good discipline in distinguishing between strategic and small-w warning areas and is concentrating on the former.

5. The Strategic Warning Staff has also been experimenting with means (graphically or textually) of conveying a "temperature reading" of strategic warning indicators. This initiative clearly has merit and should be pursued.

DRAFT

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

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USIB-D-5.1/36
28 February 1975

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD


MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : DCID No. 1/5, "Strategic Warning"

REFERENCE : USIB-D-5.1/34, 6 February 1975

1. The enclosed DCID No. 1/5, approved by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the United States Intelligence Board as of 26 February, is circulated for information and appropriate implementation. The DCI made changes to paragraph 3. c. and 3. d. which have been incorporated in the attached final version which is to become effective on 3 March 1975.

2. Copies of this directive will also be printed in the established DCID format and disseminated at an early date to holders of the Intelligence Directives Handbook.



Executive Secretary

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Enclosure

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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5*
STRATEGIC WARNING

(Effective 3 March 1975)

Pursuant to provisions of NSCID No. 1, the position of Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning and a Strategic Warning Staff are hereby established.

1. Mission

The mission of the Special Assistant, with the support of the Strategic Warning Staff, is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the provision of strategic warning intelligence.

2. Definition

Strategic warning is defined as the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the PRC, or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontation with the U.S.

3. Functions

The functions of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff are:

- a. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources which might provide strategic warning.

*This directive supersedes DCID 1/5, effective 23 April 1965.

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b. When the situation warrants it, to issue strategic warning notices to the DCI, who will notify the President and National Security Council or take such other action as he deems necessary. The DCI will also transmit the strategic warning notices to the USIB principals for further dissemination within their departments and agencies. When time is of the essence, the Special Assistant may issue such notices directly to the President and NSC with concurrent dissemination to the DCI and USIB principals.

c. To make to the DCI (and in time critical situations laterally to other USIB Principals) such other reports on the status of strategic warning as the Special Assistant may direct.

d. To conduct and submit to DCI and USIB Principals studies and analyses with a view to improving the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to provide strategic warning and with due consideration for related work being done elsewhere in the Community.

e. To arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the Government for the prompt forwarding to the Strategic Warning Staff of all the information it needs to carry out its mission.

4. Community responsibilities

a. The responsibilities of USIB departments and agencies in support of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff are:

(1) To provide full-time, senior professional intelligence personnel to the Strategic Warning Staff and other support as arranged by the Special Assistant.

(2) To provide to the Strategic Warning Staff on a timely basis all information from every domestic and foreign source pertinent to the strategic warning mission, as is prescribed in NSAM 226.

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USIB-D-5.1/36
26 February 1975

b. The DIA shall provide the facilities for the Strategic Warning Staff, including communications, data processing, logistic and administrative support.

5. Composition and Organization

a. The Special Assistant for Strategic Warning shall be appointed by the DCI in consultation with the Director, DIA.

b. The Strategic Warning Staff shall be directed by a CIA officer appointed by the DCI. He shall be directly responsible to the Special Assistant and shall serve as his deputy for strategic warning.

c. The Strategic Warning Staff shall be collocated with the National Military Intelligence Center and shall consist of intelligence officers assigned from appropriate elements of the Community in consultation with the Special Assistant.

6. Review

The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC) is hereby assigned responsibility for the formation of a USIB working group to review the functioning of the strategic warning process and to report periodically--at least annually--to the USIB on its findings.

W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence

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